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NOTES
TRUTH IN LENDING - A TIME FOR REFORM
The Truth In Lending Act' was enacted in 1968 to benefit consumers by
compelling lending institutions to disclose the true cost of credit before a con-
sumer enters into a transaction. It was assumed that the information thus
disclosed would enable a consumer to make an informed decision whether
to accept a creditor's terms, pay cash, or shop for better rates. 2 Eight years
in the making, the Act stemmed from a bill introduced by the late Senator
Paul Douglas in 1960.3 Realizing that the statute could not adequately pro-
vide for all present and future aspects of credit transactions, Congress gave
broad authority to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to implement the Act
with appropriate regulations. 4  Enforcement of the Act was to be achieved
largely through civil suits brought by individuals5 and by sanctions imposed
by designated government agencies.0 Creditors could also be subjected to
criminal sanctions.7
Eight years later, there is a rising note of concern even among the Act's
sponsors that the Act is not accomplishing its goals. Senator William Prox-
mire, who sponsored the Act after Senator Douglas left the Senate, has recog-
nized that "its beneficial purposes are being frustrated by unnecessarily com-
1. The Truth in Lending Act is a part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 160! et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Congress has enacted a multipronged
statutory scheme to protect consumer debtors: 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970) protects
consumers against extortionate credit transactions, 15 U.S.C. § § 1671-1677 (1970) regu-
lates garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970) is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and 15
U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975) is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Also included in
the scheme are the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (Supp. V 1975) and the
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1667-1667e (West Supp. 1977).
2. The Act further posits that informed consumer choice will result in economic sta-
bilization and enhanced competition among institutions engaged in extending consumer
credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
3. S. 2755, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). Regulations promulgated by the FRB appear at 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1977) (commonly known as Regulation Z).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
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plex disclosure requirements which consumers may ignore or fail to under-
stand."8
In part, this complexity is the result of Regulation Z, which expanded the
quantity and the detail of the disclosure requirements. The regulation, pro-
mulgated by the FRB pursuant to its statutory authority, was an attempt to
confine a complex market commodity within a static regulatory scheme. 9
Numerous private suits have also added to the complexity of the Act and
its regulations. Creditors protest that they are harassed by increasingly tech-
nical suits often based on minor and harmless violations of the Act.' 0 As
creditors seek to insulate themselves from such suits with lengthy disclosure
statements packed with every bit of information that the creditor thinks a
court might require, the consumer is left with the complicated disclosure state-
ment of which Senator Proxmire was complaining. As a result, there is a
feeling that the Truth in Lending Act has had little, if any, appreciable effect
on the conduct of consumers in the credit marketplace."
Two bills were introduced in the Senate during the 94th Congress to re-
form the Act, 12 and the embattled FRB has proposed sweeping changes to
simplify it.1" This note will consider the causes of the Act's current
complexity, discuss the most significant proposals for reform,' 4 and make
recommendations based on these first, albeit tentative, proposals.
8. 122 CONG. REC. S12,294 (daily ed. July 23, 1976) (remarks of Senator Proxmire
while introducing S. 3699, a bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act).
9. See Oversight On Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Banking Agencies:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1976).
10. See generally Qui Tam and Federal Reserve Board Procedures: Hearings on S.
3008 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer A flairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 551-70 (1976).
11. "The idea probably doesn't work. . . . [Tihere is no convincing evidence that
information about APR's [annual percentage rates] has led consumers to do any more
comparative credit shopping than they did before TIL [Truth In Lending]." Warren,
Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. REV. 951, 962-63 (1975).
See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 177, 182-83 (1972).
12. S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced by Senator Proxmire); S.
3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced by Senator Garn). In the 95th Congress,
Senator Proxmire has introduced two bills: S. 1312 and S. 1846; Senator Gan has
introduced S. 1501.
13. See Letter from Stephen Gardner, member of the FRB, to Senator Proxmire (July
16, 1976), 122 CONG. REC. S12,295-96 (daily ed. July 23, 1976).
14. Other proposals, such as limitations on the award of attorney's fees to consumers
(S. 3302, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)), limitation on the number of times a creditor
must change his forms in a year (S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1976)) and elimina-
tion of the "vacant lot" right of recission (ld. § 7 and S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4 (1976)) are beyond the scope of this note.
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I. EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACT TO DATE
Disclosure of credit cost terms was the essence of the Act as originally con-
ceived. 15 The underlying assumption was that credit cost disclosure would
result in more informed decisions by the consumer regarding the use of credit.
Disclosure of the annual percentage rate was seen as an important term fa-
cilitating comparison shopping. Much like unit pricing in a supermarket, the
availability of the annual percentage rate computed in a uniform manner was
thought to promote a more intelligent consumer choice. The Act's supporters
reasoned that a consumer armed with this information would help stabilize
the economy by avoiding high interest rates during a "boom" and by in-
creasing credit purchases during a recession. Furthermore, the consumer's
ability to comparison shop, defer purchase, or pay cash was expected to lead
to more competition among creditors and lower rates for all consumers.'"
The disclosure concept was originally aimed at the revelation of the true
cost of credit, 1 7 a numerical disclosure. In the interval between 1960 and
1968, this relatively simple concept expanded to include the selective disclo-
sure of information of theoretical interest to the "ideal" consumer. Originally
intended to provide the consumer with what he needed to know to make an
informed decision about the relative cost of credit, the Act as passed man-
dated that the consumer be apprised of items with which Congress thought
he ought to be concerned, such as default, delinquency, or late payment
charges, the extent of any security interest taken in the consumer's goods,
and the actual components of the total finance charge. 8 The shift from this
previous theory, a functional approach, to what has been called the "all rele-
vant factors" approach lies behind many of the problems with the Act to-
day.' 9
The Federal Reserve Board carried the shift even further in the regulations
promulgated under its statutory mandate. Regulation Z attempts to tailor
the broad sweep of the Act to the specificity desired by creditors and appar-
ently needed to regulate such a complex market. 20 For example, these regu-
15. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 128. Statement of Jonathan M. Landers
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law and Visiting Scholar, American
Bar Foundation [hereinafter cited as Statement of Jonathan M. Landers].
16. See REPORT, supra note 11, at 174.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. These requirements are contained in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(a)(I)-(5),(9),(10);
1639 (a)(1)-(3), (7),(8) (Supp. V 1975).
19. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 129.
Statement of a Panel Consisting of: Philip C. Jackson, Member, Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, et al.
20. Id. at 203.
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lations add the following requirements that are not mandated by the Act
itself: disclosure must be in a meaningful sequence as well as clear and
conspicuous, 21 components of the finance charge must be separately item-
ized, 2 2 downpayments must be broken down into cash or trade-in down-
payments, 23 and prepaid finance charges must be disclosed.24  To the extent
that these additional terms are not directly related to the credit shopping
rationale, the Act has transcended not only the functional purpose conceived
by Senator Douglas, but has also left creditors accountable to a far more elu-
sive standard. 25 From the very beginning, therefore, the Act and its regula-
tory scheme were prone to problems because a complex and variable market
was to be regulated under a vague standard of accountability.
Consumer advocates were quick to recognize the litigation possibilities in
this Pandora's Box,26 and they encountered a substantial number of recal-
citrant creditors.2 7  Congress had sought to encourage private enforcement
of the Act by granting consumers certain procedural and substantive advan-
tages, not the least of which was a federal forum. 2s Truth in Lending claims
21. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1977).
22. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(c)(8)(i), 226.8(d)(3) (1977).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(2) (1977).
24. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(c) (6), 226.8(d)(2) (1977).
25. A numerical disclosure requirement as originally conceived would have enabled
creditors to measure relatively easily their compliance with the standards. Either the fig-
ure is correctly computed or it is not. The "all relevant factors" standard which the
Act ultimately embraced is imprecise, since there is no absolute upper limit to the
number of terms that a creditor could be required to disclose. This means that a cred-
itor can never be absolutely sure that his form will be upheld in a court challenge
no matter how diligently he prepared it. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 9, at 129-30; Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 722, 726-27 (E.D. La. 1974) (an example of the length some courts are willing
to go in deciding what terms a creditor should have included in his disclosure state-
ment).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. V 1975) provides for private individual civil suits for
actual damages sustained and recovery of twice the amount of the finance charge subject
to a minimum recovery of $100 and a maximum of $1000. In the case of class actions,
actual damages can be recovered, but there is a ceiling on the penalty section of the
lesser of $500,000 or one percent of a creditor's net worth. A successful consumer can
also recover attorney's fees. To date, very few criminal suits have been prosecuted. See
S. REP. No. 94-1388, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
27. Even though the FTC REPORT ON SUnVEYS OF CREDITOR COMPLIANCE WITH
TRUTH IN LENDING (April 1971) seemed content with results which showed that 69%
of the retailers surveyed were in total compliance and 86% in substantial compliance
with the Act, there is a substantial lack of compliance disclosed by these figures. A re-
tailer was classified as substantially complying if he disclosed at least the annual per-
centage rate and the finance charge correctly. Id. at 3. Therefore, by April 1971,
(approximately 18 months after the Act's enactment), 14% of those surveyed still did
not even disclose these fundamental terms properly and 31 % had at least some violations
in their disclosure statements.
28. Some federal courts have refused to exercise their pendent jurisdiction and allow
[Vol. 26:575
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tended to revolve around questions of law, not fact, and thus lent themselves
to relatively simple preparation and frequent summary judgments. Con-
sumers were encouraged to sue by the promise of a guaranteed $100 recovery
plus attorney's fees even in the absence of actual damages.29 The "all rele-
vant factors" standard, the expense of litigation, and the threat of more suits
if a creditor's form were found to be deficient were powerful stimuli for a
creditor to settle out of court.30 Truth In Lending actions were attractive liti-
gation vehicles for consumer suits against retailers and often gave both the
consumer and his attorney a handsome return for a minimum of effort.8 ' The
huge number of private civil suits has contributed greatly to the complexity
of the Act's interpretation and has forced creditors to put more and more
information in their already lengthy disclosure statements.
The probability of a plaintiff's success was greatly enhanced by the cred-
itor's inability to claim a good faith misinterpretation of what disclosures were
required. A "bona fide" error provision in the Act3 2 was early held to excuse
only clerical errors.83 The dilemma in which creditors found themselves was
compounded by their inability to rely on unofficial interpretations of the Act
issued by the FRB staff.3 4 Creditors complained that they were being held
responsible for harmless and technical violations, 8 and there appeared to be
no limit to the requirements imposed by the courts.36
a creditor to counterclaim for the amount due under the contract. See Rumsey, Truth-
In-Lending: Congress Reacts To the Creditor's Dilemma, 24 EMORY L. J. 379, 391-94
(1975) and cases cited therein.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. V 1975).
30. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at
131-32.
31. See Statement of David L. Campbell of Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlemeyer & Mat-
thews, Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 10, at 517-538.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1970): "A creditor may not be held liable . . . if the credi-
tor shows . . . that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures . . . to avoid any such error."
33. See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Congress sought to restore some measure of protection for the credi-
tor who relies on an interpretation by the FRB that turns out to be erroneous by en-
acting a provision in 1976 that excused such good faith errors. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(f)
(West Supp. 1977). This amendment may go far to reduce the liability that creditors
now face with the vague accountability standard.
34. This problem, although now remedied by § 1640(f), initially stimulated the use
of such suits because creditors' forms, even if in compliance with FRB directives, could
be successfully challenged by consumers.
35. See, e.g., Carlin v. Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc., C.A. 75-1045 (E.D. La. 1975)
(defendant liable even though none of the figures on the disclosure statement were inac-
curate and the plaintiff was correctly informed of how much he was borrowing).
36. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 129-
30.
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Not surprisingly, creditors began to draft their disclosure statements with
particular care to cover the remotest possibility of being found deficient. This
tactic, along with continuing litigation, caused creditors to ask for numerous
FRB interpretations of the Act and regulations, a7 which in turn led to more
technical requirements and new possibilities for violations. Finally, by 1976,
members of Congress and others had begun to realize that this vicious cycle
was not going to be broken by piecemeal attempts to remedy the Act. 8  The
disclosure requirements were so complicated that it did not seem reasonable
to expect consumers to read or understand them. Such a vast body of case
law and interpretations had developed over eight years that many small
creditors could not afford the legal assistance necessary to prepare an accept-
able disclosure statement which would inevitably be doomed to instant obso-
lescence with each new judicial or administrative pronouncement.3 9
Congress had originally provided for procedures to grant exemption from
the requirements of the Act to states whose statutes were substantially simi-
lar to the Truth In Lending Act.40 This gave the exempted state sole enforce-
ment responsibility over all nonfederally chartered financial institutions within
the state. Inconsistent state requirements were preempted in those states not
granted exemption. 41 Because of the restrictions against state inspection of
federally chartered institutions, frictions in the federal-state relationship have
developed. Active state consumer protection agencies have accused federal
agencies42 responsible for enforcement in these federally chartered institu-
tions of a serious lack of diligence in enforcing consumer protection legis-
lation.43
Since the Act preempts only inconsistent state requirements, overlapping
state legislation has added another layer of complexity to the disclosure state-
ment. Multistate creditors face varying requirements from state to state. 44
37. The staff opinions are gathered together and printed in 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 31,088 et seq.
38. 122 CONG. REC. S12,294 (daily ed. July 23, 1976).
39. It has been speculated that, in contrast to its stated purpose, the Act has led to
a reduction of market competition by driving small creditors out of the market. Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 9, at 162.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1970).
42. The Act places overall enforcement responsibility on the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. The Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for the national banks, the Feder-
al Reserve Board for banks in the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board for banks subject to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1607 (1970).
43. See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 9-72.
44. Regulation Z actually allows a creditor to put inconsistent disclosures in his dis-
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If they leave out a disclosure required by the state, they risk a subsequent
finding that the state requirement is not in fact preempted. Not surprisingly,
creditors tend to include any information which might possibly be required,
thus further complicating the disclosure statements.
II. PROPOSALS TO SIMPLIFY THE ACT
In the 94th Congress, there were three major proposals 45 to remedy the
problems. They were: total preemption of state truth in lending statutes,
reduction or modification of the disclosure requirements, and modification
of the civil enforcement remedy to grant damage awards only when the
violation actually interferes with a consumer's ability to shop for credit.40
Preemption of all state laws promises to present difficulties not only be-
cause it may result in curtailed consumer protection activity in states which
have vigorously enforced their disclosure statutes, 47 but also because of the
potential enforcement problems if federal agencies become solely responsible
for oversight. The National Commission on Consumer Finance concluded
in 1971 that federal enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act was a "mixed
bag."'48 Recent congressional hearings went even further and stated that fed-
eral enforcement of consumer protection legislation was unsatisfactory. 49 Al-
though the Commisson found that state enforcement was no better, 50 testi-
mony of state officials at congressional hearings in 1976 gave a quite differ-
ent picture. 51 It is at least arguable that preemption will stifle state efforts
closure statement if there is proper separation and identification of the federal require-
ments. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c) (1977).
45. A fourth proposal would have eliminated agricultural credit from the scope of the
Act completely. 122 CONG. REC. S12,296 (daily ed. July 23, 1976); 122 CONG. REC.
S17,826 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Senator Garn while introducing S. 3875,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), a bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act). This proposal
is relatively uncomplicated and advocated by both the FRB and Senator Garn. See 122
CONG. REC. S17,826 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976); 122 CONG. REC. S12,296 (daily ed. July
23, 1976).
46. The bills introduced in the 95th Congress by Senators Garn and Proxmire gener-
ally cover these same areas. S. 1846 is particularly interesting because it calls for a
major rewrite of the Act. See S. 1846, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Hearings were
held on July 12-13, 1977.
47. See generally Statement of Lawrence Connell, Jr., Bank Commissioner, State of
Connecticut, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 29-35.
48. REPORT, supra note 11, at 56-57.
49. See S. REP. No. 94-930, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1388,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976).
50. REPORT, supra note 11, at 57.
51. See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 3-97.
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to enforce such legislation. Only the FRB has proposed total preemption,
but it apparently feels that the gains to be made by imposing uniform dis-
closure requirements and having a clear-cut delineation of enforcement re-
sponsibility outweigh the potential loss of another layer of enforcement. 52
There is general agreement that disclosure requirements must be reduced
and simplified. Two bills introduced in the 94th Congress proposed to do
that: S. 3699, introduced by Senator Proxmire, and S. 3875, introduced by
Senator Garn.53 While both bills would have eliminated certain terms which
have caused problems of interpretation or compliance in the past, 54 the Garn
bill went further than the Proxmire bill in the reductions it would have made.
It proposed to delete all disclosure requirements for both closed-end sales and
loans except the following: the total amount financed (without an itemized
listing of the total sum as is now required), the amount of the finance
charge, the annual percentage rate, the repayment schedule, and a modified
security interest disclosure. 55
Another significant proposal contained in the Garn bill, but not in the
Proxmire bill, picks up the FRB's proposal56 to limit the civil penalty section
of the Act to those violations that actually interfere with a consumer's ability
to shop for credit. By no mere coincidence, most of the terms which must
be disclosed under the Garn bill are the ones to which civil penalties would
attach. 57
52. Senator Garn believed that the proposal was highly controversial and would re-
quire more study. He also stated that preemption is not directly related to simplification
of the Act. 122 CONG. REc. S17,825 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). In fact, preemption would
eliminate additional state requirements from the disclosure statements. If the disclosure
requirements in the Act are to be reduced as the Senator proposes in his bill, it would
seem logical to preempt state requirements also; otherwise, there would be a question of
whether states could nullify the reduction of disclosure requirements by adding new ones
under state law.
53. S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. and S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) will be
referred to as the Proxmire and Garn bills respectively.
54. The requirement that such charges as taxes and other fees prescribed by law be
itemized or included in the finance charge would be dropped. S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2(c) (1976); S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1976). Both bills reduce the
description requirements for security interests taken as a result of the transaction, al-
though S. 3875 went further than S. 3699 in relaxing this requirement. Compare S. 3699,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 7(b), 8(b) (1976) with S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 11(a),
(b) (1976). Because some courts have been willing to call acceleration clauses default
payments, both bills proposed to delete that word from the disclosure requirements. S.
3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 7(a), 8(a) (1976).
55. S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 10(a),(b) (1976). The bill also deleted some.
of the disclosure requirements for open-end credit in conjunction with the deletions for
closed-end credit, S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1976).
56. 122 CONG. REC. S12,296 (daily ed. July 23, 1976).
57. No liability would attach to the security interest and late payment disclosures.
[Vol. 26:575
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III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGES
Any one of the proposals to remedy the Act, be it preemption, reduction
of disclosure requirements, or modification of the penalty section, will have
a significant impact on the consumer's benefits under the Act. The severity
of the impact of each change will depend in part on whether the companion
proposals are adopted. For this reason, they are presented in the order in
which they ought to be considered so that the Act can be reformed with a
minimum reduction in proper benefits to consumers. It is imperative that
these proposals be considered as a package because the value of the Act
for consumer purposes will be in the sum of its interrelated parts. 58
The proposal to preempt state laws completely has the dual advantage of
achieving uniformity while reducing the compliance burden now borne by
creditors who must tailor their disclosure statements for each jurisdiction
with a disclosure statute. One significant drawback to this proposal merits
careful study: the potential loss of state enforcement efforts. Loss of state
involvement would have serious ramifications for two reasons. First, the
state agencies are probably more familiar with local conditions and are rela-
tively more accessible to aggrieved consumers.5 9 Second, and perhaps most
important, the relative enforcement track records of the state and federal
agencies show serious and deep-seated deficiencies in the federal agencies in
contrast to the vigorous programs of some states.60
Although uniformity and the corresponding simplification of the disclosure
statement would make compliance easier for creditors, the strongest reason
for preemption is that it will result in a clear-cut delineation of enforcement
authority and if properly molded, get states more actively involved in this area
of consumer protection. Rather than discourage state enforcement when pre-
emption occurs, the FRB has suggested that states be allowed to incorpo-
rate the federal legislation into their own statutory scheme by reference. 61
S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §12 (1976). The civil penalties for violations would re-
main the same.
58. It is hoped that interests opposed to such legislation will not use the momentum
for reform to "gut" the Act. The Garn bill, by calling for a reduction in the disclosure
requirements as well as a weakening of the private enforcement provisions of the Act,
might have done just that.
59. See REPORT, supra note 11, at 61; Statement of Lawrence Connell, Jr., Bank
Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 24. In at
least one state, none of the federal agencies charged with banking oversight has an office
in that state. Id. at 40. Not only does a consumer encounter difficulties with distance;
he also faces the obstacle of locating the proper agency.
60. See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 3-84.
61. This proposal was put forward by the drafters of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Catholic University Law Review
Standing alone, this proposal may seem unduly optimistic because it assumes
that state legislatures will be willing to rubber-stamp federal legislation and
its administrative package. It also assumes that those states which currently
have no truth in lending statute, or are not exempted, will voluntarily assume
the financial burden of enforcing federally-drafted legislation. This budgetary
burden partially accounts for the small number of states which have sought
exemption.6 2  The proposal becomes much more viable when linked with
suggestions to reimburse states for the expenses incurred in such efforts68 and
to give state consumer agencies authority over all financial institutions within
their borders for purposes of monitoring Truth in Lending compliance. 4
Under these proposals, the FRB could utilize the standards currently em-
ployed for exemption purposes to designate those states which have suitably
organized agencies and the experience to be solely responsible for Truth in
Lending enforcement within their jurisdictions.6 The FRB could retain
oversight authority, as it does now for states that are exempt. This proposal
would encourage states to assume responsibility for the protection of their
citizens, would reduce federal-state tensions by clearly allocating enforcement
responsibility, and might result in savings by reducing the need for federal
involvement. That the result is more expensive might be attributable to
lackadaisical federal enforcement in the past.
The proposal for reduction or modification of disclosure requirements con-
tained in both the Proxmire and Garn bills66 is, at least conceptually, the least
controversial and most needed of all the proposed reforms. Reduction of dis-
closure terms would not necessarily make the average consumer less aware of
the consequences of his credit transaction since there is only a tenuous con-
Code based on their conclusion that the Truth In Lending Act effectively preempted tne
field of disclosure and that attempts by states to regulate disclosure would do more harm
than good. Letter from Stephen S. Gardner, member of the FRB, to Senator Proxmire
(July 16, 1976), 122 CoNo. REc. S12,296 (daily ed. July 23, 1976).
62. REPORT, supra note 11, at 58. Only five states are exempt: Massachusetts,
Maine, Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. Twenty-three states have no state dis-
closure statute. 1 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 2256.
63. Statement of Lawrence Connell, Jr., Bank Commissioner, State of Connecticut,
Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 34.
64. REPORT, supra note 11, at 60. Congress will have to study the ramifications such
jurisdictional rights would have for enforcement of other consumer legislation such as
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970); Letter from Lawrence Connell, Jr., Bank Com-
missioner, State of Connecticut to Senator Proxmire (Aug. 12, 1976), Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 84. For states that did not seek such responsibilities, the federal
agencies would exercise enforcement responsibilities as they do now.
66. See notes 54 & 55 supra. The general support these proposals have received is
another reason for preemption of state laws. Why allow states to require something
which Congress has determined needlessly complicates the disclosure statements?
[Vol. 26:575
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nection between credit awareness and much of the information now required
to be disclosed.6 7 Some of the information now required in the disclosure
statement, such as default and security interest terms, merely duplicates what
must appear in the basic contract between the parties and deletion of such
information from the disclosure statement should not unduly prejudice the
consumer.6 8 Other terms hypothetically of interest to the ideal consumer,
but not directly related to the credit shopping rationale of the Act, also serve
to lengthen and complicate the statement. 69 Reduction of disclosure terms
would thus promote the original salutary purpose of the Act-to help con-
sumers make informed credit decisions-and would ease the creditor's burden
of compliance. It could also reduce the number of suits clogging some fed-
eral district courts.7 0
The primary area of dispute with the proposal to reduce disclosure re-
quirements is over which terms are essential. Congressional hearings brought
out quite clearly that the following terms are considered fundamental: the
annual percentage rate, the amount financed, the finance charge, the total
payment, and the repayment schedule. 7 ' Reduction of the disclosure require-
67. See note 11 supra. The report demonstrated that it is at least arguable that dis-
closure of the annual percentage rate and finance charge affects some groups. This
finding may become questionable as the disclosure statement becomes longer and more
complicated. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9,
at 123-24.
68. Senator Proxmire's bill did little to reduce this duplication since it only elimi-
nated the need to disclose default charges. S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 7(a), 8(a)
(1976). The Garn bill was apparently intended to eliminate the requirement to disclose
default, late payment and delinquency charges, but it did not do so. Compare 122
CONG. REP. S17,827 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Garn) with S. 3875, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (1976). Neither bill eliminates entirely the security interest
disclosure. S. 3699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 7(b), 8(b) (1976); S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 11 (1976).
69. Since studies cited at note 11 supra show that consumers are often not affected
by the disclosure of the comparative cost of credit, one doubts that the credit decision
would be much affected by such terms as default charges and rebate procedures. What
is more significant about these studies is their conclusion that low income groups are
the ones least likely to use disclosure information even though they probably need it
most. See REPORT, supra note 11, at 175-77; Whitford, The Function of Disclosure
Regulation In Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 418 n.75, 421 n.81.
If there is to be any hope that such groups will use the information, it will depend upon
its presentation in an understandable format.
70. See Statement of W. Rhett Tanner of Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey, Qui Tam
Hearings, supra note 10, at 413.
71. See Statement of Jonathan M. Landers, Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 123,
133; Statement of Leonard O'Connor, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston,
id. at 139. See also S. 3857 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1976). There may be a con-
tinuing temptation to add just "one more essential term." This temptation should be
resisted lest the Act end up as complicated as it is now.
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ments to these five basics is in line with the Act's original purposes; however,
Congress should consider giving the consumer some means with which to
check those figures. Theoretically, the annual percentage rate and the fi-
nance charge could stand alone without any means provided to check their
accuracy, because the consumer should be able to go elsewhere for cheaper
credit. In reality, studies have shown that poorer consumers are not always
mobile or educated enough to shop for credit. 72  In addition, a number of
creditors still err in their disclosure of these basic figures. 73
A second disclosure sheet that does not duplicate either the contract or
the primary statement, and is available only on request, might serve to protect
lower income consumers who are not able to shop effectively for credit. 74 It
would act as a deterrent to creditors who might otherwise tack on exorbitant
charges to the cost of the credit as well as serve as a check to ensure that
the sums in the primary disclosure statement are being computed properly.
Congress should weigh these merits against the fact that a second statement
would keep the Act and Regulation Z relatively complicated. Simplification
of the Act has two meanings. To the consumer, it means simplification of
the disclosure statement. It means the same to the creditor, but he is more
interested in reforms that result in easier compliance and less threat of liti-
gation. Dual level disclosure will be controversial because it will satisfy con-
sumers without fulfilling the desires of creditors. 75
The proposal to modify the civil enforcement section of the Act by elimi-
72. See authorities cited note 11 supra. Such consumers are vulnerable to unscrupu-
lous creditors who might inflate credit cost with superflous charges. The Act has been
in effect long enough for consumers to expect that when a figure is quoted, there is no
hidden charge that he would be likely to object to. One can also argue that most con-
sumers expect their government to protect them from harsh practices and that the gov-
ernment should meet those expectations.
73. See S. REP. No. 94-1388, supra note 49, at 6. The FDIC cited 507 banks be-
tween Jan. 1 and June 30, 1976, for violations involving the annual percentage rate and
the finance charge. Of all the violations, the failure to disclose or incorrect disclosure
of these terms were most common. Id. If this is the compliance rate for bankers, one
can only wonder what it must be for less scrupulous merchants.
74. This idea was suggested during the congressional hearings. Statement of Leonard
O'Connor, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston, Oversight Hearings, supra note
9, at 140. It is true that few, if any, consumers would ask for such secondary sheets,
but consumer protection groups and governmental inspectors could use them.
75. Now that a creditor can rely on the interpretations of the FRB staff, the threat
of litigation is already reduced. This threat will be reduced even further if the substan-
tial compliance rule of the Garn bill becomes law (S. 3875 § 12). Perhaps a compro-
mise is possible which will give consumers the second disclosure statement and creditors
the protection from suits by limiting liability to only a few key terms. Creditors would
still be subject to sanctions imposed by government agencies although they would not
be subject to a civil suit. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970).
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nating creditor liability when there has been substantial compliance with dis-
closure requirements 76 has far-reaching consequences that call for careful
consideration lest the Act become a "paper tiger." Although private civil
actions have contributed significantly to the complexity of the Act and Regu-
lation Z, they have also been a significant force in achieving creditor compli-
ance. The importance of their role would increase if the proposal to preempt
all state disclosure statutes were to be enacted without some provision to en-
courage state enforcement. Even if the federal agencies can drastically
change their past dilatory habits, the federal bureaucracy may never be an
adequate substitute for an active local agency. Moreover, if the number of
disclosures were decreased, there would be little reason for reducing the en-
couragement the Act gives consumers to sue. With fewer terms to disclose,
the creditor who failed to disclose them properly ought to be held more
strictly accountable, not less. On the other hand, should Congress determine
that disclosure requirements could not be reduced without significant harm to
consumers, then the current civil liability ought to be correspondingly
weakened. To leave the Act with the same complicated disclosure require-
ments while limiting liability to a few terms would only be placing enforce-
ment responsibility on agencies already accused of being deficient in enforc-
ing the Act 77 without achieving the goal of simplification. The wiser route
would seem to be to eliminate the superfluous disclosures without also enact-
ing an essentially redundant provision that would limit liability to those few
remaining terms.78
IV. CONCLUSION
The Truth In Lending Act and Regulation Z have become so complex
that the disclosure statements drafted in compliance with them are virtually
useless to all except a student of semantics. What is needed is a movement
back to the original concept of what truth in lending was supposed to offer-
the disclosure of information that would allow the consumer to make a ration-
76. S. 3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1976). The liability would attach only if the
creditor failed to disclose one of the designated terms properly: the annual percentage
rate, the amount financed, the finance charge, the due dates, and the repayment schedule.
77. See notes 42, 43 and 49 supra & accompanying text.
78. It is conceivable that Congress will want certain additional terms disclosed with-
out creditor liability for failure to do so correctly. The Gan bill did this by requiring
disclosure of security interests and late payment charges without liability attaching.
See note 57 supra. In view of the number of frivolous suits in the past, it seems wise
to couple this substantial compliance rule with proposals which require disclosure beyond
essential terms. See note 76 supra. This limitation of a creditor's liability also makes
the second disclosure statement proposal more desirable. See note 75 supra.
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al decision about the use of credit. Preemption of state laws should be ef-
fected, but with some provision to encourage states to enforce the Act them-
selves. Reduction of disclosure requirements seems to be the surest solution
to further the credit shopping goal of the Act. The proposal to limit civil
liability should be approached with caution and set aside if the simplification
of disclosure requirements is extensive enough to limit creditor liability ade-
quately.
As the vanguard of consumer protection laws, the Act must not be allowed
to remain as a monument to bureaucratic inflexibility and a hollow reminder
of what might have been.
William P. Barry
